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Cette étude couvre un grand nombre des travaux théoriques et
empiriques réalisés sur les effets incitatifs de l=existence d=indemnisation pour les
accidentés du travail (IAT) dans le contexte nord- américain.  Nous analysons
d=abord la rationalité économique de l=indemnisation obligatoire des accidentés du
travail.  Nous étudions ensuite l=impact de l=IAT sur le comportement.  On peut
distinguer trois types d=effets : 1) l=IAT peut influencer la fréquence, la durée et la
nature des réclamations à travers une variété d=effets incitatifs.  Dans le cas
d=information asymétrique sur les activités de prévention des accidents, l=IAT peut
affecter les activités préventives des employés et des employeurs, ainsi que le
niveau de risque sur le marché.  Dans le cas d=information asymétrique sur la
véritable nature des accidents du travail, les travailleurs assurés peuvent tenter de
déclarer de faux accidents, ou des accidents survenus à l=extérieur de leur lieu de
travail.  Ils pourront aussi entreprendre certaines activités afin de bénéficier
d=indemnisations plus élevées, particulièrement dans le cas de blessures difficiles
à diagnostiquer.  De plus, on peut observer une substitution entre  l=IAT et d=autres
programmes d=assurance.  La décision de déclarer un accident du travail peut
également être affectée par la générosité des prestations.   2) L=IAT peut modifier
le taux de salaire des travailleurs et 3) l=IAT peut affecter la productivité de la firme.
 Jusqu=à présent, les écrits ont mis l=accent sur le premier type d=effets.  Les
principaux résultats montrent qu=une hausse de l=IAT est  associée à une
augmentation de la fréquence des blessures (élasticités entre 0.4 et 1), et à une
hausse de la durée moyenne des réclamations (élasticités entre 0.2 et 0.5).  Par 
ailleurs, on peut constater une relation positive entre l=accroissement de l=IAT et le
nombre de blessures difficiles à diagnostiquer.  Et, dans le même ordre d=idées, les
études ont montré (du moins au Canada) qu=il s=effectue une substitution entre
l=assurance chômage et l=assurance contre les accidents du travail.  Enfin, des
résultats empiriques ont montré que la présence de l=assurance contre les accidents
du travail conduit à d=importantes réductions du taux de salaire, tandis qu=une
nouvelle vague d=études suggère que les changements de l=assurance contre les
accidents du travail peuvent également exercer un effet négatif sur la productivité.
This survey covers extensively the theoretical and the empirical work
that was done on the incentive effects related to the existence of workers’
compensation (WC) in the North American context. It first analyzes the economic
rationale for compulsory WC. Then it studies the impact of WC on behavior. Three
types of effects can be distinguished: 1) WC may influence frequency, duration and
nature of claims through a variety of incentive effects. Under asymmetrical
information about accident prevention activities, WC may affect safety behavior
of both employers and employees and the risk level in the market place. Under
asymmetrical information about the true nature of workplace injuries, insured
workers may attempt to report false or off-the-job accidents and to undertake
activities in order to obtain higher WC benefits, especially in the case of hard-to-
diagnose injuries. Moreover, substitution between WC and other insurance
programs may be observed. The decision of reporting a workplace accident may
also be affected by the generosity of WC benefits. 2) WC may induce changes in
occupational wages rates and 3) WC may affect firms’ productivity. So far, the
literature has focused mainly on the first type of effects. The main results show that
increases in WC insurance are associated with an increase in the frequency of
injuries (elasticities ranging from 0.4 to 1), and with an increase in the average
duration of claims (elasticities ranging from 0.2 to 0.5). Furthermore, increases
in WC are associated with more reporting of injuries that are hard-to-diagnose
and, in the same line, there are some evidence (at least in Canada) of substitution
between unemployment insurance and WC insurance. Lastly, there are empirical
results showing that the presence of WC insurance induces important reductions
in wage rates, while an emerging literature suggests that changes in WC insurance
may also have negative productivity effects.
Mots Clés : Assurance, accidents du travail, sécurité du travail, incitation,
salaires, productivité
Keywords : Insurance, workers' compensation, occupational safety and health,
incentives, wages, productivity
11. Introduction
The social cost of workplace accidents is important. In a typical year in the
United States, more than 50 times as many working days are lost to work
injuries than to labor strikes, and from one-half to one-third as many working
days are lost to work injuries than to unemployment (Krueger, 1988). Not
surprisingly, policy makers have been concerned by this phenomenon and
workers’ compensation (WC) insurance has been made compulsory in most
North American jurisdictions, covering more than 90 percent of the
workforce.
WC insurance is a form of no-fault insurance in case of a workplace accident,
where workers give up the right to sue their employer in exchange for a right
to compensation. Firms are considered liable for workplace accidents and pay
insurance premiums as a percentage of their total payroll to a Workers’
Compensation Board (WCB), which compensates accident victims and pays
for their medical expenses related to workplace injuries. In most jurisdictions,
insurance premiums are adjusted to reflect the past claim records of firms
(experience-rating). WC claims result from work injuries that produce an
impairment that can be classified by duration (temporary or permanent) and
severity (total or partial). Most claims are for temporary total impairment,
where the injured worker returns to work with no residual impairment.
Claimants then receive a percentage of their pre-injury wage throughout the
duration of the claim (typically 66 % of gross wage in the U.S. and 90 % of
net wage in Canada)1.
It is important to consider the implications of the WC system since it operates
in a market context. The system may have a variety of effects on employees
and employers. Three types of effects can be distinguished2. First, WC may
influence frequency, duration and nature of claims through a variety of
incentive effects. In particular, WC insurance may lead to moral hazard
problems which arise when informational asymmetries are used for personal
gains3. The first is that of ex ante injury hazard. Since insurance covers the
financial and medical losses associated with the injury, workers’ incentive to
exercise care will diminish with increases in coverage. Moreover, because
employers fund WC benefits through premiums linked at least in part to their
firm’s safety record, there is an incentive to increase the investment in health
and safety capital when there is an increase in WC insurance coverage. These
                                                     
1 In both countries, benefits are not taxable.
2 This classification is similar to that adopted by Moore and Viscusi (1991).
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 The description that follows uses Viscusi ’s (1992) classification.
2pressures may result in changes in risk or, more precisely, in the frequency or
the duration of injuries.
A second form of moral hazard, termed ex ante causality hazard, arises
because it is sometimes difficult to identify which accidents are caused by the
job. Therefore, workers may file claims for accidents that have not occurred,
or for off-the-job accidents.  A third form might be termed ex post duration
hazard. With an increase in the insurance coverage, injured workers may be
tempted to take action in order to prolong the duration of the period over
which benefits are paid out.
A final form of moral hazard, termed insurance substitution hazard, may
arise, given that WC is in general more generous than unemployment
insurance (UI). Workers may be tempted to undertake activities in order to
benefit from WC instead of UI, when they are confronted with a lay-off. For
instance, they may report false or off-the-job accidents or, given that they
have been injured on the job, they may try to increase the duration of their
period of recovery compensated by WC.
The decision to file an accident report may also be affected by the level of
WC benefits (reporting incentives) since, in some circumstances, an injured
worker may have some discretion over whether to ignore an injury and to
continue working or to report the injury and to receive WC benefits.
Second, the change in risk described above may in turn affect workers’ wage
through changes in compensating differentials, or simply because social
insurance for job injuries will increase the attractiveness of risky employment
to workers, thus reducing the required compensating differential. Third, WC
benefits may lead to more absenteeism and the loss of firm specific human
capital, which in turn may induce productivity effects.
To our knowledge, the present survey is the first to cover all these aspects
related to the existence of workers’ compensation. As will be shown, the
literature has focused on the first type of effects described above and is
mainly North American. Section II discusses the theoretical rationale for
government regulation of WC insurance and presents the theoretical
arguments which relate changes in WC insurance coverage to changes in
certain outcomes (frequency, duration and nature of claims, wage and
productivity). Section III provides a survey of the empirical work that was
done on these issues. Section IV presents some concluding remarks and
discusses the lessons to be learned by policy makers from this literature.
32. Theoretical work
2.1. Economic rationale for WC insurance
1) A model with no market imperfection
Some authors, such as Thaler and Rosen (1976), allege that the presence of
both wage differentials for risky jobs and private insurance markets implies
that WC is unnecessary. In their hedonic model based on Rosen (1974), the
labor market is perfectly competitive, workers are risk averse and have perfect
information about risks of accidents. They are also perfectly mobile between
jobs. Firms differ in terms of certain intrinsic risks of accidents but can
influence the probability of accidents through undertaking safety
expenditures. Moreover, the marginal cost of reducing risks varies across
firms.
The model also assumes a perfect insurance market: the cost of insurance
against injuries equals its actuarial value and insurers know the true
probability of accident in each firm. Conditional upon facing a given accident
probability, each worker will choose an optimal amount of insurance
coverage. This level of insurance will equate his (ex post) marginal utility in
all states of the world (that is, with and without injury). Workers will move to
firms whose wage rate-risk of injuries combination maximizes their well-
being. If all workers are identical, firms with higher risk of accident will have
to pay a higher wage rate to attract workers. This is the case even if workers
are perfectly insured against accidents, since the insurance premium is
increasing with the level of risk prevailing in a firm.
In such a world, wage differentials across firms compensate workers for the
welfare reduction associated with a risk of accident. In equilibrium, each
firm’s marginal cost for risk reduction equals its workers’ marginal benefit
from risk reduction. Moreover, wage differentials induce a social optimal
allocation of workers across firms and a social optimal effort within each firm
to reduce hazard. This analysis formalizes the basic insights of Adam Smith’s
theory of equalizing wage differentials as applied to the risk of occupational
accidents.
In the case where preferences against risk of accidents vary across workers,
workers with low risk aversion will choose to work in high-risk firms4.
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 This will be the case if insurance is imperfect (nonzero loading or administrative charges and
hence incomplete coverage), if preferences are state dependent or if there are interpersonal
differences in physical capacities to cope with job risk. In all these cases, risk-averse workers will
not fully insure against accidents. Therefore their risk choice will depend on their degree of risk
aversion (see Thaler and Rosen, op.cit., p. 272).
4Therefore, the wage premium provided by high-risk firms will understate the
one required by individuals working in low-risk firms. Again, under the
assumptions of the model, this sorting equilibrium will be socially optimal.
This model can also be generalized to the case where workers can influence
their risk of injury through costly accident-preventing effort. As long as firms
have full information about the level of effort chosen by workers, competitive
equilibrium will also lead to a social optimum. In equilibrium, safety input
provided by each party will be such that its marginal cost for one party will
equal to its marginal benefit to both parties. This rule is analogous to the
efficiency condition in public goods theory (Lanoie, 1991).
In this model, workers insure themselves in a competitive market. However,
as long as firms are risk-neutral, one could argue that they are a natural source
of insurance to their risk-adverse workers (see Rea, 1981). Of course, under
the assumptions of the model, one should not expect this possibility to affect
the injury rate at any firm and therefore the safety level and the allocation of
workers across firms will still be Pareto-optimal. However, one should
observe smaller compensating wage differentials in higher risk firms since a
part of their workers’ total compensation will include WC insurance. In such a
world, the introduction of a public WC system that is perfectly experience
rated and that involves no administrative costs, will lead to a safety level and
an allocation of labor similar to the one observed in a competitive market.
Moreover, if WC benefits are not perfectly experience rated, higher risk firms
will be implicitly subsidized by the public system. Therefore they will have
less incentive to undertake safety expenditures. In that case, WC insurance
will lead to a sub-optimal allocation of resources (Ehrenberg, 1988).
This model shows that, in a world of complete information and perfect
markets, either public WC insurance is unnecessary or is harmful. However,
this result breaks down with incomplete information or imperfect markets,
and the literature on accident prevention discusses such situations.
2) Problems of imperfect information
Problems of imperfect information in the “market for workplace accidents”
have attracted much attention recently. As noted by Rea (1981), there are at
least five possible types of imperfect information that may affect this market:
1) Employers and insurers may not be able to identify workers who are
accident-prone; 2) employees and employers may be incorrect in their
estimates of occupational risk and of their influence on the level of risk; 3) the
employer may not be able to monitor the precautions taken by employees; 4)
5the insurer may not be able to monitor employers’ and employees’
precautions; 5) the insurer may not be able to monitor the nature of injury.
The first type of misinformation leads to what is commonly called adverse
selection. The third and fourth types reflect ex ante injury hazard and the fifth
type involves ex ante causality hazard or ex post duration hazard.
Let us first consider the case of adverse selection. This phenomenon is a
manifestation in insurance markets of the more general concept of ‘lemons’
(Akerlof, 1970). The insured may have a much better idea than the insurer of
whether he is a high- or low-risk. In the face of this asymmetric information
problem, the insurance market is either inefficient or fails entirely, the
ultimate outcome depending on the precise behavior of insured and insurer
(e.g., see Hellwig, 1987). One solution (or a partial solution) is to restrict the
range of choice the insured is allowed. A particular relevant possibility is to
impose compulsory insurance to prevent lower risks opting out. It should be
stressed that this policy does not necessary require the public provision of WC
insurance. The government could make WC compulsory, while not supplying
insurance itself. In fact, in a number of American States, WC insurance is
mandatory but is privately provided (Butler, 1994).
The second type of imperfect information concerns workers’ knowledge about
the safety level prevailing at different firms in the market. This problem has
been analyzed by Oi (1974), Diamond (1977) and Rea (1981). Following an
assumption first adopted by Adam Smith, these authors suppose that workers
underestimate risk.  Akerlof and Dickens (1982) have argued that the psychic
costs of fear of accidents may induce a cognitive dissonance phenomenon that
makes workers underestimate their perceived probability of accidents and
choose a sub-optimal level of accident-preventing effort.
Under the assumption that workers underestimate risk, Diamond and Oi argue
that mandatory insurance (privately or publicly provided) and safety
regulation are justified because they raise the expected utility of risk averse
workers. However, their analysis assumes that employees’ safety precautions
are not affected by the regulation of insurance. In contrast, Rea (1981) alleges
that mandatory insurance and safety regulation may lead workers to undertake
more risk and therefore to substitute wages for safer jobs. As a result, safety
could fall even in the absence of moral hazard. Moreover, if this effect is
strong enough, WC could lower workers’ expected utility, evaluated with true
probabilities. This analysis has some similarities with the well-known
Peltzman (1975) effect, according to which automobile safety regulations
such as compulsory seat belt may induce automobilists to drive less carefully.
This may lead to an increase in the number and the severity of car accidents
6and, if this effect is strong enough, to a reduction in total welfare.
Carmichael (1986) disagrees with the assumption that workers underestimate
risk. He integrates imperfect information by exploring the role of a firm’s
reputation in repeated games. His model suggests that it takes time for
workers to learn about changes in safety in a firm which leads, generally, to
an underprovision of safety. In contrast with Rea, Carmichael is able to make
unambiguous statements about the welfare-improving nature of government
intervention related to occupational safety and health. In particular, he shows
that a marginal increase in the level of compensation benefits leads to
unambiguous improvement in welfare.
The third and fourth types of misinformation involve a particular type of
moral hazard: ex ante injury hazard. It defines the effect of insurance on the
choice of self-protection activities by the insured when the insurer cannot
observe or enforce these activities (asymmetric information). Let us consider
the case of individual expenditure on a preventive activity, x, which can
reduce the probability of an insured event. The socially efficient level of x is
that at which its marginal cost is equal to its social benefit in terms of its
effect on the reduction of insured losses. But if losses are fully insured and the
insurer cannot monitor individual preventive activities, the private incentive is
to spend little on it. As a result, this ex ante moral hazard typically leads to an
underprovision of self-protection activities by the insured, as far as the
substitution effect is concerned (see Pauly, 1974, Holstrom, 1979, and Arnott
and Stiglitz, 1988, for careful analyses of the effects of moral hazard).
Private insurers have adopted a number of devices to reduce this problem. In
particular, incentive mechanisms may seek to share the cost between the
insured and the insurer: frequent claimants may pay higher premiums;
deductibles make the insured person pay the first $X of any claim; with
coinsurance, the insured person pays a fraction of any claim. However, none
provides a complete solution to the ex ante moral hazard, since the root of the
problem is the imperfect information of insurers about the behavior of the
insured.
In the “market place for accidents”, this problem is compounded with the
possibility of ex ante “double moral hazard” (Lanoie, 1991). Indeed, a
workplace accident not only depends on precaution levels of the worker but
also on those of the firm. Therefore, the level of WC insurance may affect the
(nonenforceable) precaution levels of the two parties. In fact, a rise of the
level of insurance benefits gives opposite incentives to both parties, at least
when the firm is experience-rated by the insurer or is the insurance provider.
It decreases the cost of an accident to the worker (inducing less precaution),
7while it increase the cost of accident to the firm (inducing more precaution).
As a result, ex ante double moral hazard does not necessarily lead to an
underprovision of precaution by both parties. Whether or not it does depends
not only on the substitutability or the complementary of the precaution levels
of the two parties, but also on the chosen level of insurance (Lanoie, 1991).
In such a context, can a government intervene to induce a Pareto improvement
in the level of precaution? As in all cases involving misinformation problems,
the answer to this question partly depends on the information the government
has at its disposal. Technological constraints make the case of a government
better informed that the private insurance sector unlikely. Therefore a more
relevant question is whether the government, with no more information than
the private sector, can improve welfare with publicly provided WC insurance.
Lanoie shows, in contrast with Carmichael (1986), that the impact of a
legislated increase in WC benefits does not necessarily lead to a welfare
improvement. An explanation for the ambiguity is that, in Carmichael‘s
approach, the probability of accidents depends only on the firm‘s safety
expenditure while Lanoie’s approach allows it to vary according to both
workers’ and firm’s safety expenditure.
The last type of misinformation concerns ex ante causality hazard and ex post
duration hazard. When the insurer is not perfectly informed about the state of
the world, an insured worker may take action in order to increase the level of
his WC benefits. For instance, he may be encouraged to simulate injuries (e.g.
Staten and Umbeck, 1982, Butler et al., 1996a, Bolduc et al., 1997) or to file a
claim that occurs off the job (e.g., Smith, 1989), especially in the case of hard-
to-diagnose injuries such as sprains, strains and low back problems. He may
also attempt to obtain a longer period of recovery compensated by WC by
exaggerating the severity of his injury or by investing resources in order to
find and convince a physician to write an appropriate medical report (Dionne
and St-Michel, 1991, Fortin and Lanoie, 1992).
Theoretical models that take into account not only the standard ex ante injury
hazard but also the ex post duration hazard and the ex ante causality hazard,
show that usual WC insurance contracts are suboptimal when the last two
types of moral hazard are present (e.g., Mookherjee and Png, 1989, Dionne
and St-Michel, 1991). In particular, partial insurance coverage alone is not
optimal. Selective auditing procedures have also to be introduced. Reports
should be audited more extensively in the case of injuries that are hard-to-
diagnose, since ex post duration and ex ante causality hazards are likely to be
more severe in that case.
The above discussion suggests that, due to partial information concerning the
8risk of accidents and to the presence of a variety of informational
asymmetries, the private labor and insurance markets are likely to fail to
provide the optimal level of safety and the optimal allocation of workers
across occupations. Moreover, our analysis of adverse selection suggests that
compulsory WC insurance is likely to improve welfare. However, this does
not imply that publicly provided WC is necessarily Pareto-improving. While
the goal of this social insurance may be to ameliorate the potential market
failures, our analysis suggests that it is not clear that it is necessarily the case.
In publicly provided WC, there is also a potential for moral hazard problems
and other adverse incentives. It is thus important to analyze both theoretical
and empirical impact of WC on variables such as 1) the frequency, duration
and nature of claims; 2) the level of occupational wage rates and 3) the level
of labor productivity.
2.2. Theoretical Effects of WC Insurance
1) Effect on the frequency, duration and nature of claims
This section analyses the theoretical impact of WC insurance on both the
occurrence (frequency and duration) of claimed accidents and their nature.
These effects are certainly those that have been most studied in the economic
literature on WC. Moreover, we pay a particular attention to the impact of
other social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance (UI) on
these variables. Indeed, recent literature has shown that one is likely to
observe a substitution between UI benefits and WC compensation.
- Effect on the frequency of claims
A change in parameters of a WC program, such as the level of benefit
coverage, will affect the frequency of WC claims through a number of
incentive effects. Thus, for a given wage rate and a given level of safety
expenditures by the firm, an increase in the level of WC benefits will induce
workers to reduce their accident-preventing efforts and it may lead them to
report false accidents or accidents that occurred off the job. These factors will
tend to raise the number of reported accidents. Moreover, not all workers who
are injured on the job report their accident to the WC Board, since there are
various costs associated with filing for WC benefits. These costs include the
value of time and resources needed to see a doctor and to fill up requested
forms, the costs associated with the probability of being controlled and to
have to undertake other medical examinations. An injured worker will do so
only as long as the expected marginal benefits of filing a claim exceed its
9marginal cost. Therefore, one should expect incentives to report workplace
accidents to be positively related with the WC benefit level, especially in the
case of minor injuries (Krueger, 1990a).
On the other hand, as long as WC benefits are at least partially experience
rated at the firm level, an increase in benefit coverage will raise a firm’s costs
associated with its own accident experience. Therefore, employers will have
more incentive to spend resources on safety prevention, for a given level of
accident-preventing effort from its employees. Moreover, higher benefits will
increase employers’ incentive to challenge claims. These effects will reduce
the number of (accepted) claims.
From this analysis, it is clear that the impact of a change in WC benefits on
the frequency of claims is ambiguous since, ceteris paribus, it creates safety
and reporting incentives working in opposite directions for employers and
employees. Moreover, the net result depends on the degree of complementary
or substitutability between safety efforts of each party as well as on the nature
of the labor contract (Ehrenberg, 1988, Krueger 1990a, Lanoie, 1992a).
Empirical analyses are required to resolve this ambiguity.
- Effect on the duration of claims
Behavior of employers and employees not only influence the rate of reported
injuries but also their duration. As discussed earlier, following an increase in
the level of WC benefits, workers may have incentives to take action in order
to obtain a longer period of recovery compensated by WC (ex post duration
hazard). Indeed, a higher benefit level generates both substitution and income
effects that induce an injured worker to increase his leisure (assumed to be a
normal good) by prolonging his period on WC. Of course, this possibility is
limited by the level of resources required to obtain the needed medical report.
These costs reflect the probability of contestation and rejection of the
physician’s report. This may involve a costly and stressful process of
examinations by other physicians, of testimony in arbitrage, and possible
delays in WC benefits payments (Fortin and Lanoie, 1992). Moreover,
through their negative effect on the level of workers’ safety efforts, higher
benefits will also raise the duration of claims, as long as lower safety efforts
increase not only the probability but also the expected severity of injuries.
On the employers’ side however, higher partially experience rated WC
benefits will play in the opposite direction, by encouraging them to increase
their safety expenditures and by increasing their incentives to challenge
claims. Again the net impact of higher benefits on the duration of claims is
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ambiguous and empirical studies are needed to shed light on this issue.
- Effect on the nature of the claims
As discussed above, higher benefits may induce a worker to simulate injuries,
to file a claim for injuries that occur off the job (as long as benefit coverage is
more generous under WC than under disability insurance) or, given that he
had a workplace accident, to obtain a longer period compensated by WC.
However, the costs of these actions for the worker will depend on the nature
of accidents. Thus one should expect these costs to be smaller for accidents
that are harder to diagnose. Therefore, higher benefits should not only
influence the frequency and the duration of claims but also the nature of
injuries compensated by WC. In particular, they should increase the relative
importance of reported hard-to-diagnose injuries.
This suggests one way to isolate ex post duration hazard and ex ante causality
hazard on the one hand, from ex ante injury hazard (effects on safety
behavior) and from effects on reporting injuries occurring on the job, on the
other. The idea is to verify whether higher benefit coverage induces more
important effects, in terms of frequency and duration, on injuries that are
hard-to-diagnose, such as back- related problems, in comparison with injuries
such as contusions, friction burn or fractures, than are much easier to diagnose
(Dionne and St-Michel, 1991, Fortin et al. 1995, Bolduc et al. 1997).
- Effect of unemployment insurance on occurrence and nature of claims
(insurance substitution hazard)
Many reasons may suggest the existence of a potentially strong
interdependency in the effects of UI and WC programs. The basic reason is
that, as emphasized by Ehrenberg (1988), the structure of both programs are
quite similar. In particular, both provide insurance against an adverse
consequence (workplace injury or unemployment) that leads to time away
from work. Therefore, as long as the risk of these events is partially
determined by employer and employee behavior, one could expect behavior in
the labor market to be affected interactively by the characteristics of both
systems. Thus as long as the worker’s net wage replacement ratio provided by
UI is smaller than the corresponding WC benefit ratio, some workers
suffering from a workplace injury may, ceteris paribus, have incentives to
take action in order to prolong their period of recovery, especially in
industries where the level of unemployment is relatively high. Indeed, in these
industries, many injured workers may expect to be unemployed and to
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received UI benefits after their period of recovery. Moreover, workers who
expect a period of unemployment (e.g. in seasonal industries) may have
incentive to use fewer resources in attempting to prevent workplace accidents.
In addition, some workers may be encouraged to shirk in order to increase
their chances of receiving WC rather than UI benefits.
Fortin and Lanoie (1992) and Bolduc et al. (1997) have provided theoretical
models that shows, under plausible assumptions, lower UI benefits will raise
both frequency and duration of WC claims, especially in the case of hard-to-
diagnose injuries.
2) Effect on wage rates
A number of studies have theoretically analyzed the impact of WC on the
wage rates (Ehrenberg 1988, Lanoie, 1990). As shown above, in a world of
perfect competition with perfect information and public WC, higher benefits
that are perfectly experience rated would reduce wage rates so as to offset the
new WC costs. Total workers’ remuneration (including the value, for workers,
of more generous WC insurance) would thus not be affected by the policy. In
other words, the downward shift in the labor demand curve in a given industry
would be offset by the downward shift in the corresponding labor supply
curve.
As long as the WC system is not perfectly experience rated, the reduction of
wage rates in high-risk industries or occupations would be larger than the
increase in firms’ WC liability, while the contrary would be observed in low-
risk industries. This will be the case if one takes into account the required
increase in the portion of costs that are not dependent on firms’ own accident
experience to fund higher benefits (cross-subsidizing effect). Therefore, the
level of compensating wage differential would be reduced in favor of high-
risk industries.
Moreover, under asymmetrical information, workers in high-risk industries
will have incentives to reduce precaution levels and to prolong the duration of
their compensated accidents. On the firms’ side, incentives will play in the
opposite direction. Therefore, the impact of moral hazard and reporting
behavior is ambiguous on reported injuries and therefore on the wage rates.
3) Effect on labor productivity
A theoretical and empirical literature is recently emerging on the effects of
WC insurance on labor productivity and available papers have not been
12
published yet. Butler et al. (1997), and Butler and Gardner (1994) present a
model of management in which managers tend to use the disability system as
a mean of getting rid of the less productive employees. They show that
workers receiving disciplinary notices (i.e., those with «management »
problems) are more likely to enter in disability status.  Furthermore, Butler et
al. (1996b) argue that, as WC benefits increase, work absenteeism increases
and firm specific human capital will be lost (holding labor and physical
capital constant) and output will fall.
3. Empirical Work
3.1. Studies on frequency, duration and nature of claims
This section will present the empirical work that was done to investigate the
different effects of workers’ compensation insurance. We will follow the
same outline as in the preceding section. A first group of studies has
examined the impact of changes in WC benefits on the frequency, duration
and nature of claims, and the potential interaction between social insurance
programs.
Claim frequency study
Recall that, theoretically, the effect of WC benefits changes on injury rates is
ambiguous; it depends on the relative magnitude of employee and employer
responses to such changes. This question has been studied extensively in the
North American context. Typically, the authors estimate an equation which
relates the injury rate to a variable capturing the generosity of WC benefits
and a set of control variable for aspects such as demographic characteristics of
manpower, industrial sector, or unionization. All reported studies in Table 1
are either American or Canadian, many of them were actually performed by a
team of researchers surrounding Richard J. Butler and John D. Worrall. Table
1 reports the authors, the data used, the definition of the dependent variable,
the definition of the benefit variable and representative benefits elasticities
obtained for each study.
A variety of data sources has been used in these studies : aggregate data at
the state level (Chelius 1977, 1982, 1983 ; Worrall and Appel, 1982; Butler
and Worrall, 1983 ; Ruser, 1985 ; Butler, 1994), data at the industry level
(Butler, 1983 ; Bartel and Thomas, 1985 ; Curington, 1986 ; Worrall and
Butler, 1988, 1990 ; Lanoie 1992a, 1992b ; Lanoie and Streliski, 1996 ), data
at the firm level (Chelius and Kavanaugh, 1988 ; Ruser, 1991) and micro data
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at the individual level (Leigh, 1985 ; Krueger, 1990a ; Moore and Viscusi,
1990, Thomason, 1993, Thomason and Pozzebon, 1995).
Most authors take the total number of claims to construct the injury rate used
as the dependent variable, while some of them are interested in certain
categories of injuries: most of the studies by Butler and Butler and associates
distinguish between temporary total, permanent partial and permanent total
disabilities ; Moore and Viscusi (1990) distinguish between fatal and nonfatal
injuries; Lanoie, (1992a), and Lanoie and Streliski (1996) distinguish between
temporary and permanent disabilities, and Thomason (1993) only considers
the permanent partial disability cases. These distinctions are often advocated
to control for «reporting effects ». Indeed, permanent disabilities or death
cases are likely to have always been reported in the same fashion to WCBs
through time, so that any detected effect of WC benefits would not be
attributable to changes in the reporting behavior.
The measure of benefits also varies across studies. American studies
performed with data at the state level often use the wage replacement ratio
prevailing for temporary total disability cases. Butler, Worrall and associates
use a measure of the wage replacement ratio expected on the basis of the
wage distribution in each state (which accounts for the minimum and
maximum insurable income)5. Studies with data at the industry level use the
industry wage and the maximum insurable income to define a wage
replacement ratio per industry (Curington, 1986, Lanoie, 1992a, 1992b,
Lanoie and Streliski, 1996). Since they include data on people who had an
accident and on people who had not, studies with micro-level data involve the
calculation of potential workers’ compensation benefits for each individual
(instead of a representative or « averaged » individual, as the aggregated
analyses do).
Virtually all these empirical analyses, which use conventional regression
techniques, find that claims frequency increases as workers’ compensation
increases. This implies, in line with our theoretical discussion, that employee
responses are stronger than employer responses. The results suggest that a 10
percent increase in benefits is associated with a 4 to 10 percent increase in
claims frequency (with an average elasticity of about 0.6 across the various
studies). These results do not seem to be influenced by the type of data used,
and findings in Canadian studies, especially in Thomason and Pozzebon
(1995) and in Lanoie (1992b), are in the same order of magnitude.
Interestingly, Butler (1983), Butler and Worrall (1983) and Worrall and
Butler (1990), who consider three types of disability cases (temporary total,
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permanent partial and permanent total), all show that the estimated elasticity
increases with the injury duration.
The only study to report a negative and significant relationship between
benefits and frequency is Moore and Viscusi (1990)6. They find that benefits
increases do tend to decrease the number of fatal injuries. This result is not
necessarily surprising since, for this category of claims, it is plausible that the
employee response to benefits changes, as described above, may be
dominated by employer responses.
Among the limitations of these studies, one should first note that the use of
aggregate data at the state level in many American studies is debatable since it
is probably difficult to account for all unobservable or difficult-to-quantify
differences in state laws and program administration. This estimation strategy
was probably appropriate in early studies when no other data source was
available, but recently, most authors have turned themselves to more
disaggregated data. Second, most of these studies fail to consider in their
specification other institutional aspects that could influence workplace safety
like experience rating and safety regulation. There are some exceptions: Ruser
(1985) controls for experience rating, Bartel and Thomas (1985), and
Curington (1986) account for OSHA7 activities, while Lanoie (1992a, 1992b)
and Lanoie and Streliski (1996) control for both experience rating and
«OSHA-type» safety regulations. Interestingly, Ruser (1985), Bartel and
Thomas (1985), and Lanoie (1992a) find lower elasticities than in the rest of
the literature : 0.35 for Ruser and non-significant results for Bartel and
Thomas (1985) and Lanoie (1992a)8. Third, as discussed in the theoretical
section, from a policy point of view, it is important to distinguish between
legitimate changes in injury rates following increases in WC coverage (the
reporting effect), and changes that could reflect an abusive use of the system.
Therefore, the question of moral hazard is crucial in this debate.
Duration studies
Generally, the severity of injuries is proxied by the duration of claims
(average duration at the state or at the industry level, and actual duration at the
                                                                                                                  
5 This measure is fully described in Butler (1983).
6 Such a result is also present in a simulation exercise of Kniesner and Leeth (1989).
7 OSHA : Occupational Safety and Health Agency.
8 Lanoie (1992b)’s results are in the range of the rest of the literature, while Curington does
not report his elasticity estimates.
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individual level). Theoretically, the impact of benefits changes on severity
rates is ambiguous for the same reasons given at the beginning of the
preceding section and because, at the aggregate level, changes in benefits may
result in a change of the mix of injuries, leading to a different average
duration. For instance, if higher benefits lead to an increase in the reporting of
small injuries that would otherwise have gone unreported, the average
severity in a state, or in an industry, may decline without any real
improvement in workplace safety.
As one can see from Table 2, again, the research on this question has been
mainly done in North America. Fewer studies are available than for claim
frequency, and they tend to be more recent. This could partly explain why
most of them have been performed with individual data. Certain studies
examine the duration of all claims as their dependent variable (Krueger,
1990b, Lanoie, 1992a, 1992b, and Lanoie and Streliski, 1996, Meyer et al.,
1996), but a number of them are based on specific categories of claims: Butler
and Worrall (1985); Worrall and Butler (1985); and Butler and Worrall
(1991a) consider low-back injury claims, while Johnson and Ondrich (1990),
Curington (1994) and Johnson et al. (1995) are using permanent partial
disability claims. The rationale for focusing on different types of injuries is
not always clear. For instance, Butler and Worrall (1991a) choose the low-
back claims « in order to minimize the impact of unobservable heterogeneity
due to differences in the type of claim, or in the administration of a claim » (p.
164). Curington (1994) chooses permanent partial disabilities to complete the
picture since most studies are based on temporary total claims. The measures
of WC benefits used in these studies are very similar to those in the claim
frequency studies.
Concerning the estimation technique, certain authors have based their
analysis on « natural experiments » (Curington, 1994, Meyer et al. 1996) and
use difference in means estimates and conventional regression analysis, while
the others use hazard models. As explained in Kiefer (1988), these models are
based on conditional probability (e.g., the probability of an individual leaving
WC in the tenth week, given that he has been absent nine weeks). Without
entering in all the technical details, it is commonly accepted (e.g., see the
discussion in Meyer, 1990) that hazard models are superior to regression
analysis to investigate spells duration, especially when time-dependent
covariates are relevant (changing benefits over the duration of a claim) and
when there is censoring in the data (spells that are not completed).
The principal finding of these studies is that the duration of disabilities varies
directly with WC benefits. The benefit elasticity in these studies is about 0.2
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to 0.5, with certain outliers (Johnson and Ondrich find an elasticity around 1,
while Krueger’s results are in the 1.5-2 range).
Among the methodological issues and possible limitations related to this
work, one should note again that most of these studies fail to consider in their
specification other institutional aspects that could influence safety. Another
more technical issue is the assumed parametric form of the baseline hazard in
studies using hazard models. Most previous work in this area has relied on
parametric methods which assume, despite a lack of theoretical support, a
specific form for the baseline hazard (e.g., Weibull). Only Fortin et al. (1995)
(to be discussed in details in the next section) use the mixed proportional
hazard model devised by Meyer (1990) that does not impose a parametric
form on the baseline hazard. Another important issue is related to unobserved
heterogeneity. As is well known, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity may lead
to a dynamic selection bias in the parameter estimates and in the estimate of
the baseline hazard. For example, as time goes by, it is possible that workers
who do not return to the labor market after an accident are those with an
intrinsic bad health condition. If one does not account for this unobserved
heterogeneity, one may end up with the false impression that the hazard
declines through time. A convenient and commonly used distribution for the
random variable reflecting unobserved heterogeneity is the gamma, but there
is no consensus on the best distribution to adopt.
Studies related to the nature of claims
As discussed above, problems of moral hazard, which arise when
informational asymmetries are used for personal gain, are of different types.
First, Butler and Worrall (1991b) develop an approach that allows one to
distinguish between certain of these types (the studies presented in this section
are summarized in Table 3).  Their approach can be summarized in the
following way :  Assume that all workers receiving WC are being paid the
maximum weekly benefit for wage replacement.  If the WCB raises this
maximum by 10 percent, the total value of benefits will increase, ceteris
paribus, by 10 percent (the actuarial effect).  If, instead of a 10 % increase, we
observe a 15 % increase in total benefits paid, the extra 5 % might be
expected to have arisen from two effects : workers and firms may have
changed their level of prevention (the « risk bearing  effect » which is
equivalent to the ex ante injury hazard we defined earlier), and /or workers
may have made more claims, for longer periods etc. (the « claims
reporting effect», which is a combination of the ex post duration hazard, the
ex ante causality hazard and the claims reporting effect we defined earlier).
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Butler and Worrall argue that evidence concerning the relative impacts of
these two effects can be obtained by investigating the responsiveness of WC
payments to changes in the wage-replacement benefit rate.  If it is assumed
that there is no claims reporting effect on medical expenses –workers have no
reason to claim medical expenses, so an increase in wage-replacement should
not produce additional medical claims-  any change in medical claims which
follows an increase in wage-replacement must have arisen from the risk-
bearing effect.
They tested this hypothesis using data from 33 states during the period 1954-
1981     and found that a 10 percent increase in benefits led to a 13.2 percent
increase in total benefits paid for wage replacement and to a 3.6 percent
decrease in medical expenses.   They conclude from this that the risk bearing
effect was –3.6 % and that the claim reporting effect was +6.8 % (if total
claims increased by 3.2 % more than the acturial effect, when the risk bearing
effect suggested that they should have decreased by 3.6 %, then the claim
reporting effect must have been 3.2 + 3.6 = 6.8).   This is an interesting
approach.  However, it depends crucially on the assumption that the claims
reporting effect (as they define it) has no impact on medical claims, which
could be debatable, especially if this effect leads to a change in the mix of
injuries that are reported (this point will be discussed in more details below).
Other authors have used more directly the nature of claims to detect the
presence of moral hazard problems. A group of researchers has investigated
how difficult-to-diagnose injuries evolve with changes in benefits (ex ante
causality hazard and ex post duration hazard). Given that each study has
adopted a different approach, we have to discuss them in turn.
Staten and Umbeck (1982) are the first to present evidence of moral hazard
from the behavior of air traffic controllers. In the 1970s, these workers were
covered by a disability program which, in case of a work-related claim, was
providing them with a compensation equal to a fixed percentage of their pay
(around 75 % non-taxable) for the duration of the claim. Given the type of job
of these people, an injury did not need to be physical ; stress-related disorders
that prevented the employees from working would qualify. Certain changes in
the 1970s in the rules governing disability claims made claiming disabilities
more attractive for controllers. The 1974 rule changes made monitoring false
claims generally more complicated and made catching a fake stress-related
claim especially difficult.
A controller who wanted to fake a claim for stress-related disability needed to
show the disability was job-related to collect, and the examiners were directed
to look for specific events that could have contributed to the stress. This
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created the incentive to manufacture on-the-job incidents that could have
caused the stress. The natural candidate here was a « separation violation », in
which planes for which the controller was responsible came too close to one
another. Two sorts of separation violations are recorded : System Errors and
Near Mid-Air Collisions. The former represent any violations of the standard
separation requirements ; the later are much more serious and directly life
threatening. Because either sort of violation would do equally well for the
purposes of filing a claim, a controller who did not want to cause unnecessary
danger would be more willing to generate a minor violation than a near
collision. And, in fact, the authors show that the number of System Errors
jumped significantly after the 1974 change, but there was only a small,
statistically insignificant change in the number of Near Mid-Air Collisions.
Smith (1989) raised the possibility that workers’ compensation may be paying
for some off-the-job injuries. He argues that these injuries reported as work-
related would probably be difficult to diagnose, relatively easy to conceal, and
tend to be reported early in the shift, especially on Mondays. From a sample
of about 57 000 injury cases that occurred in 1978 and 1979 in seven states9,
Smith finds that of the three largest categories of claims, strains and sprains
are reported earlier in the day. Moreover, the propensity to report strains and
sprains earlier in the day is significantly increased on Mondays and on days
following a three-day weekend. Smith estimates that 4 % of strains and
sprains are misrepresented as having occurred on the job.
Card and McCall (1996) reexamine this question with a 10 percent random
sample of «first reports» of injury filed with the Minnesota Department of
Labor and Industry between 1985 and 1989. Combining these administrative
data on workplace injury claims with CPS data on medical insurance
coverage, and using different estimation technics, they are not able to show
that workers with low medical coverage rates are more likely to report a
Monday injury than other workers. They conjecture that the «Monday effect»
may be a consequence of the return to work after a «week end hiatus» (p.20).
In a recent paper, Derrig (1997) proposes a more direct test of the «Monday
effect» in light of recently available data from the Insurance Fraud Bureau
(IFB) of Massachusetts. Summarizing WC claims and taking accepted IFB
fraud referrals as proxies for fraud claims, he finds no significant difference in
the distributions of each day of the week, even adjusting for days after
holidays. Similar empirical distributions are consistent with the hypothesis of
elevated true claim injuries on Mondays, and their accompanying fraud level.
                                                     
9 These states are: Colorado, Delaware, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Virginia and
Wisconsin.
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Similar distributions are not consistent with the off-the-job injury explanation
of the Monday effect.
Dionne and St-Michel (1991) investigate the presence of moral hazard by
looking at the variation in days on WC for injuries with difficult-to-diagnose
conditions relative to those with less difficult-to-diagnose conditions. They
split injuries into two dimensions based on injury severity (minor versus
major injuries) and whether the condition was easy or more difficult to
diagnose. Like Smith, they reason that moral hazard responses will be greatest
for the difficult-to-diagnose injuries: lower back pain (minor injury) and
spinal disorder (major injury). Their analysis is based on a change in Quebec
coinsurance parameters occurring in 1979. They consider a sample of about
5000 injury cases (half before the change and half after). Their OLS estimates
show that, as insurance coverage increased in 1979, days spent on difficult-to-
diagnose claims rose significantly more than did claims with easy diagnosis.
They also find that, once the interaction with diagnosis difficulty was
controlled, the 1979 shift had no independent effect on the average duration of
claims. This means that most of the impact of the increasing generosity of the
regime on durations came through an increase in days by those with difficult-
to-diagnose injuries.
Workers are not the only parties in the disability process that are sensitive to
financial incentives. In this perspective, Butler et al. (1996a) analyze the
existence of behaviors associated with moral hazard from health care
providers in U.S. HMOs (Health Maintenance Organization). HMOs are per
capitated payment programs in which physicians contract to meet all the
health care needs of an individual (or a family) for an annual fee. However,
they get paid on a fee-for-service basis for workers’ compensation injuries, on
top of their per capitated fees, and so are financially better off when they
classify as many of their treatments as work related as possible. Physicians
outside HMOs face different payment systems: fee-for-service doctors get
paid the same for treating a broken bone arising from an accident at home as
they do for the same type of break occurring on the job.
This leads to the hypothesis that, as HMO coverage expands, relatively more
sprains and strains are expected because these are difficult-to-diagnose
injuries. To test this hypothesis, they use a database on the types of WC
claims across states and over time (15 states for the time period 1980-1989).
Estimations are done with a multinomial logit model in which they assume
that the typical worker may experience one of five states : 1) no injury; 2)
sprains and strains (including low back); 3) lacerations and contusions; 4)
fractures and crushing injuries; and 5) all other types of injuries. The
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elasticities for the replacement ratio indicate that a 10 % increase in benefits
leads to a 1.25 % increase in sprains and strains. A 10 % increase in the
proportion of the population covered by HMOs leads to about a 0.8 %
increase in the proportion of strains and sprains.
Interaction between social insurance programs
Fortin and Lanoie (1992) examine indirectly the presence of moral hazard
behaviors (insurance substitution hazard) through the interaction between WC
and unemployment insurance (UI). In particular, they argue that, since WC is
in general more generous than UI (which is the case in most industrialized
countries, see Lanoie, 1994), workers about to be laid-off may have incentives
to reduce their prevention efforts so as to benefit from WC instead of UI.
Workers suffering from a workplace accident may also be tempted to take
action in order to obtain a longer period of recovery compensated by WC,
especially if they know that they would be laid-off when returning on the
labor market. These arguments lead to the following theoretical predictions:
1) an increase in the wage replacement rate under WC should lead to a higher
frequency and/or longer duration of claims ; 2) an increase in the wage
replacement rate under UI should have the converse effect.
They tested this hypothesis with a pooled time-series and cross-section
database at the industry level (30 Quebec industries covering the period 1974-
1987). They find that a raise of 1 % in WC benefits leads to an increase of the
average duration of accidents in the 0.9 - 1.4 % range, while an increase in UI
payments reduces the average duration of accidents with an elasticity in the
0.5 - 0.7 range. The results with respect to injury frequency are not
conclusive.
The moral hazard problem described above is more likely to be important
when injuries are difficult-to-diagnose (e.g., low-back injuries) and in
industries where the level of unemployment is such that many workers may
expect to be unemployed and to receive UI benefits after their recovery. This
is the case in seasonal industries such as the Canadian construction industry,
which is less active during winter because of weather constraints.
Fortin et al. (1995) estimate the effect of WC and UI benefits on the expected
duration of claims using a unique panel data set allowing them to investigate
more fully the issues that we just raised. The data base is composed of
longitudinal WC administrative micro-data on more than 30,000 workers in
the Quebec construction industry for the period 1976-1986. For the empirical
work, they use a mixed proportional hazard model, devised by Meyer (1990),
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that does not impose a parametric form on the baseline hazard and that takes
unobserved heterogeneity into account using a gamma distribution. They find
that, for hard-to-diagnose injuries, an increase of 1 % in the generosity of WC
is associated with an increase of 0.71 - 1.09 % in the expected spell duration ,
while the elasticity with respect to UI benefits is -0.54 (a result similar to that
found in Fortin and Lanoie, 1992). Furthermore, the fact that an accident
occurs in December rather than in July (December corresponds to the end of
the construction season for most workers) induces an increase of 21.2 % in
the expected duration. This is another piece of evidence that there is
substitution between WC and UI in the construction industry.
Bolduc et al. (1997) extend this work to show that WC insurance may affect
the composition of reported occupational injuries. Based on an expected
utility framework, their theoretical model predicts that, under reasonable
assumptions, an increase in the WC wage replacement ratio (or a decrease in
the UI wage replacement ratio) leads to a larger increase in the probability of
reporting a difficult-to-diagnose injury than in the probability of reporting an
easy-to-diagnose injury. The initial database used in this study is the same as
the one used in Fortin et al. (1995). The parameters of the model are estimated
using a three alternative multinomial probit framework with random effects10.
Their results confirm their predictions. In particular, the impact of an increase
in the WC replacement ratio on the probability of accidents ranges (in terms
of elasticity) from 0.83 to 1.45 for difficult-to-diagnose injuries and from 0.72
to 1.03 for easy-to-diagnose injuries (for the period 1979-1986). Furthermore,
the impact of an increase in the UI ratio ranges (in terms of elasticity) from -
1.93 to -2.32 for the difficult-to-diagnose injuries, and from -1.20 and -1.47
for the easy-to-diagnose injuries. In line with these results, they also show that
the probability to report a difficult-to-diagnose injury is significantly greater
in winter (the dead season in the construction industry) than in other seasons.
3.2. Wage Effects
Another current of empirical literature is investigating the question: who
actually pays for workers’ compensation?11 In particular, is it possible that the
cost of workers’ compensation be shifted, completely or partly, to workers
through lower wages ? As discussed above, this question can be analyzed
through conventional labor demand and supply curves. WC is a form of
payroll tax that shifts down labor demand, resulting in a lower wage at the
                                                     
10 The empirical approach is actually an extension to panel data of the approach developed in
Bolduc et al. (1996) and Bolduc and Ben-Akiva (1991).
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new equilibrium. The magnitude of the wage change depends on the relative
elasticities of labor demand and supply. Another approach is to consider that
the existence of workers’ compensation has some value for workers that could
lead them to accept lower wages. Specifically, the existence of WC may mean
lower risk premia (or compensating wage differentials) for risky jobs, which
would also entail a wage reduction.  As discussed earlier, given the level of
experience rating, this impact could vary across low and high-risk industries.
We have identified five empirical studies that have investigated the
relationship between WC costs and wage levels. They are summarized in
Table 4. In general, they use, as their dependent variable, a conventional
measure of the wage (like the after-tax weekly male wage of production
employees ; Butler, 1983). The workers’ compensation variable is either a
traditional measure of workers’ compensation benefits, as those described
above, or a measure of workers’ compensation costs (e.g., Dorsey and Walzer
use the rate paid for WC liability expressed in dollars per $100 of payroll).
Most authors (except Butler, 1983) have used micro data at the individual
level, and some of them have focused on workers in risky jobs (e.g., Gruber
and Krueger, 1991, use data from a national sample of individuals in five
high-risk jobs : carpenters, truck drivers, nonprofessional hospital employees,
gasoline station employees, and plumbers.)
In general, the results show substantial impacts of workers’ compensation
on the wage (except for Butler, 1983). Dorsey and Walzer (1983) find that,
for every 1 percent increase in workers’ compensation costs , wages decline
by 1.4 percent. Moore and Viscusi (1990) conclude that higher compensation
benefits, from the employer’s perspective, more than pay for themselves.
Gruber and Krueger (1991) show that 86 % of workers’ compensation costs
are shifted onto workers in the form of lower wages12.
As one limitation of this literature, one should note that the authors have little
to say on why the impact would be so strong. As put by Chelius and Burton
(1995, p.157) « the conclusion that higher workers’ compensation costs could
be more than compensated by lower wage is a radical one that, undoubtedly,
will be sharply contested by many members of the workers’ compensation
community ».
                                                                                                                  
11 For an excellent survey, see Chelius and Burton (1995).
12 In the same vein, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) present evidence on the extent to which
injured workers in Ontario (1979-1988) paid, through lower wages, for « reasonable
accommodation » requirements designed to facilitate their return to work after their injury.
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3.3. Labor Productivity Effects
As mentioned earlier, a recent literature has focused on the effect of WC on
labor productivity. In particular, Butler et al. (1997), and Butler and Gardner
(1994) have tested the hypothesis that managers partly get rid of their low
productivity workers through the WC program. Butler et al. (1997) show that
workers receiving disciplinary notices (i.e., those with «management »
problems) are much more likely to enter in disability status. A notice
increases the probability of filing a claim from about 12 to 15 percent.
Moreover, Butler et al. (1996b) test the hypothesis that higher WC benefits
reduce labor productivity through its impact on absenteeism and firm specific
human capital. For this matter, they use a data base covering 14 U.S.
manufacturing sectors from 1980 to 1991. These data include information on
value added, employment, capital, WC benefits and specific human capital.
These two last aspects are crucial in their analysis. Benefits are measured by
the total amount of WC benefits paid in the industry divided by the total
payroll, a measure which displays little variability in the sample13. As a proxy
of firm specific capital, they use the « average job industry specific job tenure
of employees » from the CPS. Assuming that output follows a Cobb-Douglas
process, estimations are made in which value added is regressed on
employment, capital, tenure, benefits and an interaction term between tenure
and benefits. The estimated implied elasticities are ranging from 0.05 to 0.3.
These results (especially those in the upper range) are a bit surprising since
the benefits measure displays little variability. This suggests that the data base
used is probably not the most appropriate one to study this phenomenon14.
4. Concluding remarks and policy discussion
To our knowledge, this survey was the first one to cover extensively the
theoretical and the empirical work that was done on the incentive effects
related to the existence of workers’ compensation in the North American
context. Three types of effects have been distinguished : 1) Through various
incentive effects (ex ante and ex post moral hazard, substitution between WC
and unemployment insurance, reporting incentives) WC may affect the
frequency, duration and nature of claims; 2) WC may induce changes in the
wage level and 3) WC may affect firms’ productivity. So far, the literature has
focused on the first type of effects. The main results have shown that
                                                     
13
   Mean : 0.03 and standard deviation :  0.0098.
14 They also tackle the question with state longitudinal data (1954-1991), but they no longer
have information on the capital stock (by state) and job tenure.
24
increases in WC insurance are associated with an increase in the frequency of
injuries (elasticities ranging from 0.4 to 1), and with an increase in the
average duration of claims (elasticities ranging from 0.2 to 0.5). Furthermore,
increases in WC are associated with more reporting of injuries that are
difficult-to-diagnose and, in the same line, there are some evidence (at least in
Canada) of substitution between unemployment insurance and WC insurance.
Lastly, there are empirical results showing that the presence of WC insurance
induces important reductions in wage rates, while an emerging literature
suggests that changes in WC insurance may also have negative productivity
effects.
For policy makers, our results raise the question of the appropriate rate of
wage replacement provided by WC in case of workplace accident. Are the
rates actually in place too high or too low ? Pressure groups have their
opinion which are probably irreconcilable. Unions want higher replacement
rates, while business associations often criticize the great cost of workers’
compensation insurance (although the results showing that WC cost is
transferred to workers through lower wages put this criticism in a different
perspective). Of course, it is difficult to determine theoretically or empirically
what is the optimal rate of replacement15. The literature on moral hazard
(e.g., Arnott, 1991) only tells us that the replacement rate should be less than
100 % !
Should policy makers be worried by the empirical results showing that
increases in WC are associated with increases in the level of workplace risk
(duration and frequency of injuries)? Not necessarily, as discussed earlier,
these results indicate that employees response to changes in WC are stronger
than employer responses. This is a likely outcome if experience rating is not
pervasive, which seems to be the case in most jurisdictions, especially for
small firms. This could suggest that further increases in WC replacement rate
should be accompanied by more intense experience rating if one wants to
control total WC costs. One should recognize, however, that movements in
that direction are not likely; for instance, five Canadian provinces have
reduced their WC replacement rates within the last five years.
More worrying are the results of the studies related to moral hazard. In
relation with these results, one should note that U.S. WC costs, as a percent of
payroll, rose from 1.96 in 1980 to 2.36 in 1990, a 19 % increase in the real
                                                     
15 There is some work on the optimal replacement rate provided by unemployment insurance
(for instance, see Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992).  Viscusi and Evans (1990), through an
estimation of state-dependent utility functions, present a calculation showing that, in the U.S., the
optimal rate of income replacement under WC is 0.68 of the gross wage.  However, their
analytical framework does not account for moral hazard.
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costs of U.S. workplace accident insurance. At the same time, real benefits
increases were modest, and workplace fatalities -presumably a good proxy for
job safety- fell steadily from 13 per 100,000 to 9 per 100,000 by 199016,
which means that it is unlikely that the increased costs are attributable to more
dangerous workplaces. One relatively unexplored explanation of this cost
trend is the change in the mix of claims reimbursed. This explanation is
somewhat supported by the results indicating that increases in WC insurance
are associated with more difficult-to-diagnose injuries (soft-tissue injuries and
low-back pain) and longer duration of such claims.
In fact, the results presented above could suggest that more resources should
be devoted to the screening of the difficult-to-diagnose claims, especially
those arising on Mondays, those that are treated by an HMO physician, and
those occurring in a period surrounding a lay-off. One should keep in mind,
however, that if the efficiency cost of detection (medical exams, litigation
etc.) is larger than the efficiency cost of moral hazard, then it may not be
optimal to put more resources in detection. In fact, as long as there is no major
improvement in the way physicians can detect these types of injury
(especially low-back pain), it is clear that behaviors associated with moral
hazard will persist.
The issue of substitution between UI and WC investigated by three Canadian
studies raise the question of the optimal gap between the wage replacement
rate under UI and that under WC. From the moral hazard literature, one can
make the argument that, because abusing from WC (finding an
accommodating physician etc.) is probably more difficult than abusing from
UI, the insurance coverage should be lower for UI than for WC. However,
there is no study on the optimal gap between the generosity of the two
regimes. Lanoie (1994) provides a comparative analysis of the WC and UI
systems in 14 OECD countries. It turns out that Canada is one of the countries
(with Australia) where the gap between the generosity of the two regimes is
the largest. This suggests that actions reducing this gap (reducing WC
insurance coverage or increasing the generosity of UI) may be warranted.
Lastly, another worrying finding is that of Butler et al. (1996b) showing that
increases in WC benefits are associated with lower productivity. However, as
discussed above, more research on this issue is certainly required before we
have a clear picture of the links between WC benefits and productivity.
                                                     
16 These figures are taken from Butler et al. (1996a).
TABLE 1
Representative estimates of the effect of workers’ compensation benefits on injury rates
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
Bartel and
Thomas (1982)
Various industries in 22 states during
the period 1972 through 1978
Expected benefit for a temporary
total disability
Lost work days (for job injuries) per full-
time employee
0.626
Bartel and
Thomas (1985)
Three digit SIC manufacturing
industries per year ; industries from
1972 to 1978 ; data are averaged over
22 states
Expected benefit for a
representative wage earner who
files a claim for a temporary total
disability
Lost workdays per 100 full-time worker
(occupational illnesses are excluded)
0.346
Butler (1983) Manufacturing industries per year ; 15
industries over 32 years in South
Carolina
Constructed by taking the average
observed wages and then
computing the expected benefits
(accounting for minimum and
maximum insurable income)
Injury rate index constructed with the
principal components analysis. Includes
four categories: death, dismemberment and
disfiguration, permanent partial injury and
temporary total injury
From 0.29* to
1.13*
Butler (1994) Cross-section time-series data base
covering 39 states during the period
1954 through 1984
Wage replacement ratio expected
on the basis of the wage
distribution in each state
Number of claims in non agricultural
sectors per employee
0.4***
Butler and
Worrall (1983)
State per year ; 35 states from 1972 to
1978
See Butler (1983) The number of claims filed by nonself-
insuring firms per thousand employees
Three types of injury:
 temporary total
 minor permanent partial
 major permanent partial
0.352*
0.4*
1.1*
Chelius (1977) Cross-section of industries in 18 states Ratio of weekly WC benefits to
weekly wages in a given industry,
year and state compared to the
same ratio for all other states
Injury rate Positive and
significant impact
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
Chelius (1982) Manufacturing industries in 36 states
from 1972 to 1978
Ratio of weekly WC benefits to
weekly wages in a given industry,
year and state compared to the
same ratio for all other states
Ratio of the number of injuries per 100 full-
time workers in a given industry, time
period and state to the number of injuries in
all other states
Occupational illnesses are excluded
Positive and
significant impact
Chelius (1983) Manufacturing industries in 28 states
from 1972 to 1978
Ratio of weekly WC benefits to
weekly wages in a given industry,
year and state compared to the
same ratio for all other states
Ratio of the number of injuries per 100 full-
time workers in a given industry, time
period and state to the number of injuries
nationwide
Positive and
significant impact
Chelius and
Kavanaugh
(1988)
The maintenance staff at 2 New Jersey
community colleges ; quarterly
observations from 1979:1 to 1984:3
A dummy variable equaling 1
when WC benefits were lowered
WC claims rate for claims lasting more than
7 days
0.346***
Curington
(1986)
18 manufacturing industries in New-
York from 1964 to 1976
Ratio of the New-York maximum
weekly benefit for temporary total
disability relative to the average
weekly wage for each industry
Number of compensated WC claims per
1000 full-time equivalent employees
(Occupational illness cases are excluded
and the injured worker must have been
unable to work for seven days)
Not reported
(significant positive
effect)
Kniesner and
Leeth (1989)
Simulation exercise calibrated to
reproduce the American labor market
in the early 1970s
The median after-tax income
replacement rate for a married man
in USA
They considered three types of injuries: non
impairing injury, permanent partial
disability and permanent total disability
0.21**
Krueger (1990a) Micro-level data from current
population survey ; information is
available on 27,000 individuals for two
consecutive years 1983-84 or 1984-85
Potential temporary total WC
benefit
A 0-1 variable marking the transition into
the WC program
All types of industrial accidents and illness
are considered
0.741**
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
Lanoie (1992a) Quebec data at the industry level ; 28
industries for the period 1974-1987
The rate of wage replacement in
case of a temporary total disability
Two variables:
FREQUENCY: log [RATE
 i t /(1-RATE i t )
where RATE is the total number of
accidents (including diseases) with at least
one workday lost divided by the number of
full-time employees.
PERMRATE: Same definition as
FREQUENCY with the numerator of
RATE being the number of permanent
disability cases
Non-significant
Non-significant
Lanoie (1992b) Quebec data at the industry level
covering 28 industries for the period
1983-87
The variable is based on the net
wage replacement ratio obtained
by a disabled worker in case of
temporary total disability
Log [RATE
 i t /(1-RATE i t ) where RATE is
the total number of accidents (including
diseases) with at least one workday lost
divided by the number of full-time
employees.
0.523*
Lanoie and
Streliski (1996)
Quebec data at the industry level
covering 28 industries for the period
1983-90
The variable is based on the net
wage replacement ratio obtained
by a disabled worker in case of
temporary total disability
See Lanoie (1992a)) 2.38**
Leigh (1985) 11,889 American workers ; period
1977 to 1979
A proxy measure of the potential
benefit a worker on WC would
receive
A dummy variable which takes the value 1
if respondent receives any WC benefit
0.3*
Moore and
Viscusi (1990)
1173 individual workers ; for 1982 The potential weekly benefits
based on the temporary total
disability
Number of fatal accidents per 100,000
workers
,0.02**
Ruser (1985) 25 manufacturing industries across a
maximum of 41 states for the years
1972 to 1979
The average weekly real income
benefit paid to a worker during the
period of recovery from a total
temporary disability
 Injuries per 100 full-time workers (All
types of injuries)
 Injuries with lost workdays per 100 full-
time workers (excluding fatality cases)
0.062*
0.116***
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
Ruser (1991) Longitudinal microdata set of 2,788
manufacturing establishments for the
years 1979 to 1984
The average real weekly WC
benefit for production worker’s
divided by 100
Frequency of lost-workdays injury and
illness cases per 100 workers years
(excluding fatalities)
From 0.2 to 0.82
(mostly significant)
Thomason
(1993)
Claimants of the state WC ; 5 states for
the period 1979 to 1981 (about 16,000
observations)
The weekly permanent partial
benefit payment
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the claim was classified as a permanent
partial disability and 0 if it was not
0.4***
Thomason and
Pozzebon
(1995)
A national sample of individual
Canadian workers ; 1986-87 and
1988-89 longitudinal panels (about
52,000 observations)
A measure of worker’s expected
temporary total disability benefits
A 0-1 variable constructed with this
question: Did you receive income from WC
in past year ?
From 0.363*** to
0.410***
Worrall and
Appel (1982)
The claims data, from the NCCI,
include all indemnity and non-comp.
medical (medical only) claims for the
period 1958-1977 in the State of Texas
The average weekly indemnity
benefit for temporary total
disability
 Temporary total disability claims
divided by the medical-only claims
 All indemnity claims divided by the
medical-only claims
0.614***
0.465***
Worrall and
Butler (1988)
15 industries from South-Carolina
pooled over the period 1940-1971
The expected WC benefit for the
average worker
Annual injuries per employee resulting in
permanent partial injuries
Annual injuries per employee resulting in
temporary total injuries
2.46
0.16**
Worrall and
Butler (1990)
15 industries from South-Carolina for
the period 1940-1971
The expected WC benefit for the
average worker
 Temporary total injuries per employee
 Permanent partial injuries per employee
 Permanent dismemberment or
disfigurement
1.09***
2.79***
1.74***
* Significantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level ** Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level  *** Significantly different from
0 at the 0.01 level
TABLE 2
Representative estimates of the effect of workers’ compensation benefits on injury duration
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
Butler and
Worrall (1985)
Claim for low-back injuries beginning
in 1979 in Illinois
Weekly benefits under WC Expected duration of workplace A 10% increase in
benefits increases
the average claim
duration by 0.23
weeks
Butler and
Worrall (1991a)
Sample of low-back claims that started
in 1985 from 12 states
See Butler and Worrall (1985) Expected duration of claims 0.04*
Curington
(1986)
18 manufacturing industries in New-
York from 1964 to 1976
Ratio of the New-York maximum
weekly benefit for temporary total
disability relative to the average
weekly wage for each industry
A severity index that integrates the
actual days lost from work for
temporary impairments with a measure
of permanent impairment
(Occupational illness cases are
excluded and the injured worker must
have been unable to work for seven
days)
Not reported (non
significant negative
effect)
Curington
(1994)
Permanent partial disability cases
closed by the New-York WCB from
1964 through 1983
The weekly benefit received Number of weeks of work absence for:
 minor permanent partial
impairments
0.13 to 0.24
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
 severe permanent partial imp. 0.75 to 1.34
(mostly significant)
Johnson and
Ondrich (1990)
WC clients with diverse permanent
partial disabilities from Florida, New-
York and Wisconsin injured in 1970
The WC benefit received Expected duration of work absence 0.96*** to 1.16***
Johnson, Butler
and Baldwin
(1995)
Survey of 8690 Ontario workers with a
permanent partial disability claim
between June 1989 and June 1990
Benefit-wage ratio Duration of first absences Non-significant
effect
Krueger
(1990b)
Temporary total claims in Minnesota
filed in 1986 and closed by July 1989
(25,446 observations)
The observed weekly benefit Log of duration in weeks 1.67**
Lanoie (1992b) Quebec data at the industry level
covering 28 industries for the period
1983-87
The variable is based on the net wage
replacement ratio obtained by a
disabled worker in case of temporary
total disability
Log (AWL) where AWL is the average
number of workdays lost per accident.
(includes all type of accidents)
Non-significant
effect
Lanoie and
Streliski (1996)
Quebec data at the industry level
covering 28 industries for the period
1983-90
The variable is based on the net wage
replacement ratio obtained by a
disabled worker in case of temporary
total disability
Log (AWL) where AWL is the average
number of workdays lost per accident
(includes all type of accidents)
0.67*
Meyer, Viscusi
and Durbin
Indemnity claims beginning in 1979 in
Michigan (M) and Kentucky (K) (about
The fraction of previous earning
replaced by WC
The measure of duration is the number
of weeks of temporary total benefits
0.29*** to 0.4***
(M)
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
(1995) 3,000 observations) paid plus anticipated future weeks if
the claims is still open
0.33 to 0.55** (K)
Worrall and
Butler (1985)
Male workers who experiment a
nonwork state due to low back
temporary total injury in Illinois
beginning in 1979
Replacement ratio (the wages that are
replaced by WC benefits)
Expected duration of work absence 0.463***
* Significantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level ** Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level
TABLE 3
Studies Focusing on Moral Hazard Issues
Estimates of the effect of workers’ compensation benefits on injury rate or injury duration 1
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
Bolduc, Fortin,
Labrecque,
Lanoie (1997)
Micro data 10,000 workers in the
Quebec construction industry over each
month of the period 1977-1986
The level of benefits divided by the net
marginal wage
A three alternative dependent variable:
1) a difficult-to-diagnose accident
2) a easy-to-diagnose accident
3) no accident
Injury rate:
From 0.83** to
1.45** (1)
From 0.72** to
1.03** (2)
Butler, Durbin
and Helvacian
(1996)
Individual claim data from 15 states for
the period 1980 to 1989
Expected level of temporary total
benefits in each state-year divided by
wages
A multiple choice variable with four
injury types:
Sprains/straims
Laceration/contusion
Fracture/crushing
All others
Injury rate:
 0.164**
,0.383***
 0.25***
,0.298***
Dionne and St-
Michel (1991)
5,000 closed cases of work-related
injuries which are associated to total
temporary disability
Dichotomous variable representing a
greater insurance coverage
In (number of days of compensation) Injury duration:
Not reported
(significant positive
STUDY
UNIT OF OBSERVATION
AND SAMPLE
BENEFIT
VARIABLE
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BENEFIT
ELASTICITY
effect)
Fortin and
Lanoie (1992)
Quebec data at the industry level: 30
industries for the period 1974-1987
Net wage replacement ratio for a
worker with a temporary total disability
Average number of workdays lost per
accident (including diseases)
Injury duration:
From 0.9** to
1.4**
Injury rate:
From ,1.6 to ,1.9
Fortin, Lanoie
and Laporte
(1995)
Longitudinal WC administrative micro-
data on more than 30,000 workers in
the Québec construction industry for
the period 1976-1986
The WC replacement ratio (benefits
divided by pre-WC net marginal wage)
calculated individually for each year
Expected duration of absence Injury duration:
0.71 before 1979
1.09 after 1979
* Significantly different from 0 at the 0.10 level ** Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level  *** Significantly different from
0 at the 0.01 level
1 Because they do not calculate benefit elasticities the studies of Butler and Worral (1991b), Staten and Umbeck (1982), Smith (1989), Card and McCall (1996) and
Derrig (1997) are not reported in this Table.
TABLE 4
The impact of workers’ compensation programs on the wage
STUDY DATA
MEASURE OF BENEFITS
OR WC COSTS RESULTS
Arnould and Nichols
(1983)
Sample of the 1970 population census
(USA), 1/10,000 sample (⊃ 1,800)
Percentage of wages recouped under state
WC laws
Negative impact of WC on the wage
Butler (1983) Fifteen industries in South Carolina,
1940-1972
Benefit index capturing the average real
annual payments for injuries resulting in
death, permanent disabilities and temporary
total disabilities
A1$ increase in expected benefits leads to a
wage decrease between 11.5 and 14.0 ¢
Dorsey and Walzer
(1983)
National sample of 5843 blue collar (May
1978)
The rate for workers compensation liability
insurance expressed in dollars per $100 of
payroll
1% increase in WC costs leads to a 1.4%
wage decline
Gruber and Krueger
(1991)
National sample of 15,244 individuals in
five high-risk jobs: carpenters, truck
drivers, hospital employees, gasoline station
employees and plumbers (1979, 80, 81, 87,
88)
Corresponding workers’ compensation rate
per $100 of payroll
86.5 percent of WC costs are shifted on
workers through lower wages
Moore and Viscusi
(1990)
See Table 1 See Table 1 An increase of $1000 in annual WC cost
leads to an annual wage reduction of $890
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